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ABSTRACT
This study was done to see the effects of a war on the economy and the internal politics
of the United States. In selecting the engagement, we would study we agreed the Iraq War would
be aided by a large amount of sampling of public opinion that was more nuanced than in
previous wars. The Iraq War was a very complicated war, as it was controversial from the
beginning and became a political issue while continuing to be a war fought by Americans
abroad. Based on the literature, there were many starting effects and assumptions that were
accounted for such as the ‘rally round the flag effect.’ As a historical landmark, the Iraq War is
important for being a significant conflict after the Vietnam War, another very controversial
conflict in the eyes of the American public.
The hypothesis that I presented were not supported by the data. The impact of the war on
the economy was not strong enough that it would create pressure for the sort of model I created
to apply. In this model the economic problems faced domestically could lead to more
unemployment and therefore to higher military recruitment rates. While this was partially true in
2008, the consequence was not a significantly higher amount of people in the military.
Ultimately, this project requires to be done in a more thorough setting where effects may be
compared with those of other similar countries in similar scenarios.
Keywords: political science, war studies, war, Iraq, Iraq war, statistics, labor economics,
economy in war, war support, casualties, presidential approval, unemployment, military
recruitment, American politics
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INTRODUCTION
On March 20, 2003, the United States (U.S.) and her Coalition partners invaded Iraq to
neutralize their perceived weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) capability. While their major
combat operations triumphed, the war evolved into a counter-insurgency mission that saw
limited success. This study aims to analyze how public opinion is shaped by wartime events that
impact the amount of support for the mission and unemployment. The Iraq War is significant to
analyze, as it is the first long-term and concluded American war since the Vietnam War. To
understand how democracies behave during preventative warfare, the distinction between
capitalist democracies and non-democratic closed economies must be discussed as it relates to
their armed forces. Next, I explain the influence of military recruitment and unemployment on
presidential approval. Following that, I discuss casualties and war support as it pertains to
presidential approval. The methodological section includes some hypotheses and the model I
created to better explain my argument. At that point, the paper concludes with a summary and
my suggestions for the expansion of this study through further research.
The case of the Iraq War is one of a conflict fought by a hegemonic democracy against a
despotic and militaristic regime. The impact of the war can be seen in the political and economic
spheres, which affects the rise or fall of presidential approval rates and thus impacts politics.
This project will attempt to untangle these influences to understand the political and economic
impacts on the democracy spearheading the intervention.
My intent is to analyze the common trends found between casualties and public support
and study by comparing changes in unemployment to public support. The Iraq War is a peculiar
episode in that is not a minor war, but it is very far from being a total war. This makes it a good
1

conflict to study the impact of unemployment on the war effort. I say this because this conflict is
one of a limited scope. A total war is one where the hostilities do not differentiate between
civilian and military targets, creating a situation where states must militarize as much as possible
to prevent their demise. In doing so the state’s economy becomes entirely attached to the war,
and one would expect a massive impact on the economy due to important changes in production
and due to high conscription numbers. A minor war would not cause such a disruption in the
economy; therefore, one could compare the status of the economy before and during the war to
see the impact of warfare on a mostly civilian economy that has yet to be militarized by the state.
War mobilizes resources that the state would not mobilize otherwise, therefore war economies
might see some differing effects from peacetime economies.

2

DEMOCRACIES AT WAR
Democracies often have voters as their soldiers, impacting the relationship between the
state and the armed forces.1 Many soldiers and their families are citizens in their society,
meaning they get to vote for, or against, a bellicose president. While not all soldiers are voting
citizens, they hold some political influence as a representation of veterans and by forming part of
the collective memory.2 This means that the military is not an institution which has no political
impact but quite the opposite. The U.S. is not a demilitarized society. It has strong democratic
principles and will likely continue to respect that identity. The responsibility of the military to
guard the people gives military service in democracies a sense of civic duty, with many soldiers
being full members of the community or working toward that goal. This ensures there are
democratic principles that unite the military to the state. Non-citizen soldiers can be rewarded
with citizenship in the U.S., and this has been proven to be a significant incentive for noncitizens to serve.3
Since 1973, the U.S. has had no draft, thus, the military consists of an all-volunteer force.
Recruitment is different under these conditions, as people are not conscripted but see some value
in military service and volunteer.4 This also means that the military might be more effective in
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combat, as commanding officers are there voluntarily and do not see their service as something
that is keeping them from alternate civilian jobs.5
Citizens in a democracy like the contemporary U.S. enjoy the right to vote for their
leaders, who in turn decide to pursue or avoid war. Therefore, the voter can be considered a
check on the executive to limit their military ambitions. Presidents have been aware of such a
reality and have, therefore, always justified their wars prior to engaging.
Democracies enjoy other advantages stemming from their capitalist system. Democracies
tend to have strong financial markets that accelerate the rate of production and innovation in
technology due to monetary incentives.6 Therefore, firearm special interests in the U.S. hold
political power due to a strong military-industrial complex. In turn, this creates a group of
business interests in the U.S. that profits from warfare and incentivizes the government to pursue
certain policy via election contributions.7 The profiting from war further accelerates the
militarizing of an economy, as more capital in the industry exacerbates the development of
weapons systems. A well-equipped army can engage in warfare that limits casualties, while more
efficiently defeating an enemy. The U.S.’s reliance on ordinance and high-altitude bombing is
certainly helped by mass production and a robust financial system.8 Initiative by the officers is

5
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only possible when they have enough supporting material to act independently of higher
command, without sacrificing efficiency.
Modern democracies cannot act without public support, yet public opinion is not
randomly generated but can be carefully managed. Studies done with seemingly neutral countries
were conducted prior to the war to get a sense of the aggregate American’s opinion of
conducting military engagements abroad. There were two different studies done with countries
that had been largely absent in American rhetoric then, one being Yemen and the other East
Timor.9 Respondents to the Yemen test showed that support for the mission was highly impacted
by the White House’s framing of the conflict, consistent with Bruce Jentleson’s hypothesis. 10 In
this and other cases, the primary policy objective (PPO) framing that was most enthusiastically
supported by respondents then, was that of intervention as a part of the ‘war on terrorism.’ It is
unsurprising to find that the new framing of the ‘war on terror’ was the most influential framing,
given how transformative the September 11th attacks were for the U.S. The East Timor survey
demonstrates the influence that domestic and international elites have through their rhetoric. The
impact of elite rhetoric is strong, as intervention in East Timor would yield 11 percent approval
if only the president supports the plan, and 35 percent approval when there is international and
domestic consensus that multilateral action must be taken in East Timor. These results show that
the American public is not inherently bloodthirsty and demonstrates that war can only be
achieved when those in charge have reached a consensus.

9

Ibid, 100-117.
Jentleson, Bruce W. “The Pretty Prudent Public: Post Post-Vietnam American Opinion on the Use of Military
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The warfare waged by democracies is unlike that of other governments, as democracies
cannot begin interventions without popular support. Soldiers that are employed in democratic
and capitalist developed nations are unlike their non-democratic counterparts. Democratic
soldiers are empowered members in their society or are working to reach that status. Citizens can
vote for leaders and therefore voice their support for the foreign policy pursued and may be
influenced by non-citizens. In the U.S., the primary issue for voters in most elections is the
economy, as that is the experience that directly relates to their lives the most.11 In times of war,
foreign policy also ascended to the top level, with about 35% of the population in 2004
identifying that as their most important issue.12 When the United States is engaged in warfare,
the political climate changes to reflect the changed perspective on the world.

11
12

Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler, Paying the Human Costs of War, 169.
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ECONOMICS AND RECRUITMENT
What leads civilians to take jobs in the military in times of war? The answer is not easy to
pinpoint, as there are several factors at play.13 The economy impacts everyone, therefore it’s
logical that it would also impact an individual’s choice to serve in the military. Soldiering is a
job regardless of the differences, and as such there are economic forces that dictate how
recruiting will be conducted, namely that of unemployment. It is an investment (therefore a cost)
for the government to train soldiers, forcing the military to be prudent with the resources at their
disposal.14 The fact that both the soldier and the military must act as rational economic actors,
makes the democratic military one that is inherently more efficient. Large markets to pool
resources from and providing incentives for skilled commanders allows for an advantage
unmatched by any other state.15
The advancement of technology has changed how we see war and who the participants
are. The trend away from relying on ‘troops on the ground’ started decades before the 2003
invasion. The unpopularity of some prior missions, and the government’s desire to not dampen
war support, led to the development of high-altitude bombing.16 The apex of this practice would
be the bombings of Kosovo, where no American casualties were taken at the cost of higher
civilian casualties resulting from the new tactic. This change created even more variety in the
experiences of those serving in the military, reinforcing an environment where soldiers must be
specialized and required more technical training.17 This embracing of capitalism enables the

13

Cohn and Toronto, “Markets and Manpower,” 436.
Ibid, 439-442.
15
Ibid, 438-439.
16
Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler, Paying the Human Costs of War, 45-46.
17
Cohn and Toronto, “Markets and Manpower,” 440-441.
14

7

usage of PMCs (Private Military Contractors), justified under the argument that they cost the
taxpayer less.18 Their lack of discipline and the relative independence they were given led
directly to the uprisings in Fallujah.19
The increased role of technology in war does not diminish the role of the combat soldier.
Since better trained and equipped militaries require less soldiers, their personal contributions
become more significant. Since there are less people involved in warfare than in previous
engagements, there are fewer personal accounts of what occurs in the battlefield, which could
make for a more unified voice from those who have served. I argue that these soldiers have an
inherent incentive for supporting warfare as it could mean more opportunities for advancement
for the individual soldiers. Some soldiers are also attracted to joining the military solely because
they want to fight the enemies of the U.S., as was the case with many recruits who joined up
immediately following 9/11. According to manpower dynamics literature, modern militaries rely
on either conscription or an all-volunteer force. Except for a few demilitarized or failing states,
the demand for soldiers is nearly universal as there are a plethora of security challenges facing
nations today ranging from conflict prevention, peace support, humanitarian missions and
national defense.20
The history of the 19th and 20th centuries pushed many threatened states to adopt
conscription, with armies swelling in numbers. Conscription brought about the need for a
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professionalized officer corps that trained uneducated masses for combat.21 Originally,
conscription was associated with republican values of civic duty, but as casualties increased
drastically and tensions spiked between civilians and the military most democracies began to
adopt volunteer forces.22 The “ever-evolving technological innovations in communications,
equipment, and weaponry demand the best-qualified and best-trained personnel,” shaping how
modern democracies wage war, preferring quality over quantity from their troops.23 Recruitment
methods impact a society’s ability to wage war efficiently, thus impacting how a state conducts
warfare. States are constrained in their choices since they must find an effective and inexpensive
way to fill their ranks while maintaining efficiency.
Militaries as organizations face many of the same issues as corporations in the private
market. These entities must compete for resources, more qualified personnel and must adapt to
the ever-changing nature of society. The balance between less well-trained troops and more men
on the field must be achieved by each state according to their own needs. Conscription is
tolerated when the security threat is obvious, and military service is not seen as
disadvantageous.24 Conscription may be employed in a democracy under those conditions, but
the drafts must not appear unwarranted, or recruitment will suffer. If a draft is created that seems
to be unnecessary or predatory, people who would gladly serve under a justified condition would
consider leaving the country or hiding to avoid service. This sort of impact was seen in the
Vietnam War era, with people fleeing the draft because they did not think Vietnam was worth
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American involvement or because they considered the draft to be racially insensitive.25 While
both recruitment practices have their advantages and disadvantages, the doctrine of war used by
the U.S. is better suited to a volunteer force, as American forces have rarely been used for
national defense.26
Recruiting is a balancing game and an economic activity that the military participates in.
This balancing act is dependent on the economy and population of the state. The general trend is
for individuals who have better opportunities or more job protections (and economic safety nets
in general) to not volunteer for service.27 Essentially, those who volunteer tend to consider the
military a better opportunity for them than their civilian alternatives. This tends to suit armies
whose stance isn’t one of classical national security but are more expeditionary. Arguments have
also been made that volunteer forces allow for justification of a more aggressive foreign policy,
as conscripts are more dependable in national defense roles.28 Volunteers are conducive to a
more aggressive foreign policy because the government cannot be blamed for taking these
people out of the job market, since they have voluntarily agreed to military service instead of
taking a civilian job. This line of thinking makes foreign military intervention less controversial
with the public, therefore it is more palatable. Volunteer forces tend to cost more in terms of
payroll since draftees are paid less than volunteers, the cost per soldier increases as volunteer
forces grow and the state is more likely to raise taxes to expand the volunteer forces.29

25

Appy, Christian G. Working-class War: American Combat Soldiers and Vietnam. Chapel Hill, NC: University of
North Carolina, 1993. 221-225.
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Cohn and Toronto, “Markets and Manpower,” 438.
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Conscripts might cost less per soldier, but they are on average less effective in offensive roles
than in defensive ones. There is also a high deadweight loss in volunteer forces due to
inefficiencies in tax collection, that might be alleviated by conscription.30 A deadweight loss
occurs when the government imposes taxes or limitations on production or transactions of a
good, causing there to be less sales than would have optimally happened. Because volunteers are
paid higher wages than conscripts, the government is more likely to increase taxes to pay for
more volunteers, further disturbing the labor market. This would indicate that there is
undoubtedly a correlation between unemployment, recruitment and an individual’s desire to
volunteer. The findings “[indicate] that states with less regulated labor markets, in general,
should prefer volunteer forces over conscription, unless there are pressing military reasons for a
draft (e.g., a high threat of homeland invasion).”31
While democracies benefit from having meritocratic practices in their militaries, market
factors still impact their performance in war. Much of the literature on casualties mentions the
unequal burden of that weight on the lower socioeconomic sectors of a population. Aggregate
county-level analysis has shown there to be a casualty gap, or an inequality in the distribution of
casualties across communities on a basis of education and economic background, in the U.S.32
This trend has only increased from the Korean War through to the war in Iraq. This inequality is
in part because of the societal competition over the same population pool. Recruits tend to have

30
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31
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lower economic and educational backgrounds in comparison to their own counties. Recruitment
offices also tend to have an easier time recruiting when unemployment is higher.33 These two
factors point to the possibility that recruits are more likely to come from a lower economic
background, have less skills applicable to the military, and thus are more likely to be tasked with
risky combat roles.
There is research to suggest a strong link between unemployment and recruitment. A
study done by the RAND Corporation on recruitment from high school seniors and graduates
shows different incentives for different circumstances in the individual’s life.34 Higher national
unemployment did correlate with more recruitment among seniors, but it’s important to note that
unemployment by itself does not push seniors into the military, as those with a high family
income are not as likely to volunteer regardless of unemployment. Interestingly, graduates who
have jobs are more likely to volunteer the more hours they are given at work, perhaps signaling
that economic desperation and having fewer other life commitments (such as family) are
important recruitment factors. Kilburn and Klerman argue that personal factors were more
influential in the choice to enlist than direct economic factors, yet the trend would suggest that
recruits are likely to volunteer when they perceive the military as an avenue of upward social
mobility. Recruitment officers are aware that recruitment is easier when the economy is
underperforming.35 Confidence in the military in times of war is essential as it sets up the starting
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war support. Gallup polling suggests that the military has been the most respected institution in
the United States for the last two decades, due to their efficiency and professionalism.36
Since the economy is consistently one of the most important topics for voters, the
economy indirectly shapes our foreign policy. It is also important to note that many people think
that there is a connection between the president and the economy. There is both direct and
indirect influence, that the president has on the economy. Direct influence is exerted through
pursuing certain policies whereas indirect influences come in the form of rhetoric.37 Many
citizens see the president as the steward of the economy, and while they do not hold him/her
entirely responsible, they do expect good stewardship in general. While most know that the
president does not immediately control the economy, respondents displayed differences in their
economic perception based on the president’s party identification.38 Perceptions of the economy
cannot be separated from the labor market, where one would see the most impact from
unemployment. Therefore, issues in the economy and how the war advances, may be seen as
deficiencies in the steward’s job.39

36
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CASUALTIES
Most of the early literature on casualty effects stems from John Mueller’s work on the
Korean and Vietnam Wars. He determined that as casualties rose, war opposition would increase
non-linearly, in relation to voter’s casualty tolerance.40 Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler disproved this
early hypothesis with their regression analysis of war support and casualties.41 They found that
the more logical explanation for the fluctuations among war support was casualties incurred
when the U.S. seemed to be losing those conflicts, lowering war support. War support is a
function of expectations of success and rightness in the decision to go to war.42 Casualties by
themselves do not damage war support to make the American public willing to withdraw from a
military intervention. Instead, it is the combination of casualties, lack of war progress and debate
within the public about how justified military interventions are.43 Regressions indicated that the
public was responsive to heightened casualties only in times when war seemed hopeless or
unjustified, as war support remained relatively unmoved by the same number of casualties at a
point when war appeared to be necessary and progressing toward victory.
Casualties in war have decreased significantly for the U.S. since the Second World War.
This can be attributed to the increased levels of technology in our weapons systems, more
advanced medical experience and practices, a military doctrine that attempts to minimize
exposure to risks, and perhaps more effective intelligence assets.44 All this means there are less
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troops on the ground. In response, people’s upper limit for casualties in a given mission has
decreased proportionally, thus the public would no longer accept losses comparable in value with
the Second World War but would accept the same proportion of casualties for combat today.
The American public cannot endure active combat in a foreign war endlessly. The
literature makes it clear that there are limitations to the use of casualties as a cause of
dissatisfaction with the war, hence it is only used as a yardstick to measure the cost of war as it
progresses.45 Using the answers to these questions, it is easy to divide the American population
into three distinct groups: doves, hawks, and the swing constituency.46 Doves tend to oppose war
despite the amount of lives lost, hawks tend to support wars to unsustainably high levels of
casualties and the swing constituency may accept moderate amounts of casualties.47 For this
reason, political efforts are usually focused on attracting the swing constituency and not the other
groups.
Cuing respondents on casualties had distinct results from when surveyors did not mention
casualties. Thinking in terms of lives lost in a conflict, opens the door to fallacies like failing to
accept sunk costs.48 Those who were cued into it were more likely to only support missions that
the Joint Military Staff would be very confident of, as supported by another study.49 Despite this
significant difference, the public is sensitive to casualties regardless of being cued to thinking
about them. Albeit they are less sensitive when not cued in to think in terms of lives.50 The
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public uses casualties as a metric of success. They can make trade-off decisions about how many
casualties are too many, called their casualty tolerance.51 This casualty tolerance is affected by
the mission objective, meaning different conflicts have different levels of tolerance from the
public and therefore enjoy different levels of support from the people.
The PPO approach makes the argument that voting behavior is mainly affected by the
rhetorical framing of the conflict by the White House. Jentleson concluded that the public polled
differently for missions justified as humanitarian, security oriented, and later as part of the global
‘war on terror.’52 Security scored higher than humanitarian in aggregate, with anti-terrorism
surpassing it in the later round of surveying.53 This is not at all universal, as was the case in the
interventions in Somalia in the early 1990s, when humanitarian justifications rallied more
support from the public than the later security framed missions of UNOSOM II.54 There were
some significant demographic differences among those surveyed, along with some of the
possible explanations given. Older respondents expected higher casualties, probably due to them
having experienced previous wars. Women were less likely to give a larger window of
opportunity (with higher casualties). Non-whites were 15 percent less likely to support the war
up until 1500 deaths. More educated respondents typically had a higher casualty tolerance, likely
because on average more educated respondents are wealthier and are less likely to have a close
relation with a combat soldier. Another potential explanation is that more educated respondents
are more aware of the political ramifications and are more defeat phobic than casualty phobic. 83
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percent of Republicans and 35 percent of Democrats supported up to 1500 deaths in Iraq in Nov
2004.55 When respondents were asked what the best response to the problem in Iraq would be, 75
percent wanted more pressure, 69 percent wanted more troops, and among those who had heard
about Fallujah, they were 10 to 20 percent more likely to want more troops.56 Originally, much
of the public accepted the idea that the atrocities in Fallujah were done by a small group of
extremists, but later the American public made clear in polls that ‘the hate’ was coming from
Iraq in general, showing a change in perspective and a disassociation from events on the ground
and public perception.57
Casualties are only tolerated when they are accompanied by victory on the ground and in
the minds of people. Unsurprisingly, survey respondents signaled that the American military
should focus on decreasing American combat casualties, American combat injuries and even
local civilian casualties in Iraq. The results were only the opposite when asked about enemy
combatants. The public was less affected by the number of injured compared to casualties of
U.S. troops. The significance is that while this impact is lower, it shows the public reacted to
both those killed and those injured.58 These results indicate that the public is not impartial to any
civilian deaths, with academic debates arguing that they hold more influence than previously
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considered.59 When compared to other wars, this conflict had a much lower number of casualties
due to battlefield medicine improving. This makes this war one with relatively few killed to the
relatively many injured. Therefore, when we test for casualties we will test for both those killed
and those injured.
There has been some controversy around the use of casualties as a metric of pressure in a
war, as previous engagements were affected by other factors. The Somalia mission is discussed
first, with the notion that 18 casualties led to the desire to withdraw from the country. The data
seems to prove the opposite held true, and the desire to respond with an equal or more aggressive
military posture was the most popular idea among Americans after the Battle of Mogadishu.60
Polling data shows that no pressure to withdraw was caused by the casualties suffered, instead
the pressure to withdraw came from the majority perception in the U.S. that the Somalis did not
want American help despite it being a humanitarian mission.61 Results show that most
Americans would have supported staying in Somalia. Similarly, other deployments such as that
in Lebanon echo the results, showing a concurrence between most scholars writing on the
subject.62 In the case of Lebanon, the bombing that killed over two hundred American marines
also resulted in more respondents signaling for a more aggressive response, instead of more
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desire to withdraw.63 The American people are willing to bear relatively large casualties in the
execution of a popular and justified war.
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WAR SUPPORT
The public’s attitude toward a war is a function of several variables. The expectations of
success combined with how justified the public believes the war to be yield a product used as a
measure of the public’s support for war.64 In democracies, voters act as a check on government
action. In this case, that forces the president to justify military interventions. How the public
receives that justification will determine the amount of support the war effort will garner. The
public’s expectation of success is based on their confidence in the military leadership and their
perception of the mission’s progress.65 Both domestic and battlefield events can change
perceptions of the war.
Support for a war is dependent on the national circumstances and can drop quickly in the
face of defeat. This is shown by studies done on the differences between the U.S. Restore Hope
mission and the UNOSOM II mission.66 War support had already eroded due to the unorganized
nature of the earlier UNOSOM II mission that led to some reckless casualties.67 Had the Battle of
Mogadishu not happened after the embarrassing mistakes of the UNOSOM II mission, the event
might not be remembered as such a large defeat.68 One could even make the argument that the
mission was successful even if seen as a failure by the American public.69 War support tends to
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decrease throughout the mission as casualties increase and more negative events are exposed, as
hopelessness in the mission grows.
The work of Steven Kull and Clay Ramsay has expanded much of the literature on war
support, explaining the impact of domestic and international politics. In the United States, party
identification has a large impact on the voter’s perception of the world.70 Republicans are
exclusively receptive to domestic politics, whereas Democrats pay attention to domestic politics
and use international institutional support as a ‘second opinion’ on the use of force. A war cannot
be started in the U.S. if the executive is not invested in the mission, but they alone cannot secure
all the support to launch a war. A president trying to secure support for a war may only get about
11 percent of the voters to strongly support it, while a president with bipartisan and international
support may convince as much as 35 percent of the voters to be strongly supportive of the war.71
Major support for a mission by either party will convince most of those voters to support the war,
with bipartisan support ensuring relatively high support for the war.72 Lacking support from
either party or the international community will hinder the potential war support enjoyed at the
beginning of the war, when the support will be highest.
Initial surveys will overstate support, as the “rally ‘round the flag” effect inflates support
short term.73 Elite consensus and perceptions of success have been demonstrated to be pivotal in
forming the amount of support for the war.74 Expectations of success are prospective and
70

Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler, Paying the Human Costs of War, 156-157.
Ibid, 109-117.
72
Ibid, 111.
73
Ibid, 68. & Baker, William D., and John R. Oneal. 2001. “Patriotism or Opinion Leadership? The Nature and
Origins of the ‘Rally ‘Round the Flag’ Effect. Journal of Conflict Resolution 45, no. 5 (October); University of
Maryland. 661-687
74
Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler, Paying the Human Costs of War, 155.
71

21

therefore not fixed.75 In the summer of 2006, support for the war decreased due to the delay in
forming an effective Iraqi government and growing indications that sectarian violence could
evolve into a civil war.76 President Bush lost his majority in Congress that year, Secretary of
Defense Rumsfeld resigned and the Iraqi strategy changed. Increased sectarian violence was
matched by a downward trend in American casualties, showing how support for the war can
decrease even among low casualty rates.77
The public form their perceptions of success based on presidential rhetoric. When
surveyed, responders are likely to reflect rhetoric coming from the White House, being quick to
adopt the new narrative provided by the president.78 President Bush originally justified the war
as a preemptive action to neutralize the threat of WMDs. This objective switched to defending
our regional allies as the WMDs proved to be unsupported by facts. After, the objective changed
again, now reflecting a need to support democracy in Iraq to stabilize the country.79 These
changes were in part because of the Kay Report disproving the WMD scenario and the capturing
of Saddam Hussein leaving the U.S. without a clear enemy.80 The public noticed Bush’s early
pivots toward the democratic justification and were quick to adopt them, indicating how the
public will form perceptions of victory not based on what the president repeats most, but by
rhetoric the public is sensitive to. In this case, the public was already sensitive to the idea of
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forming a democratic republic in Iraq and were eager to ditch previous explanations, while
maintaining the framing of the war as part of the larger ‘war on terror.’81
Individuals have prospective and retrospective thoughts on war, and this is reflected in
their voting behavior. The 2004 election offered an insight into how these beliefs can be
manifested in an election, as explained by Morris P. Fiorina’s theory of retrospective voting.82
Retrospective judgements about how right a leader was in entering a war are pivotal in forming
judgments on leadership. A study shows that this is the single most influential factor when voters
are considering electing a new president in times of war.83 This trend makes arguing against the
warring president more difficult to do while maintaining support for the war high, as was the
case for Kerry in the 2004 elections.84 The incumbent president may be benefiting from the
opinion that changing a well perceived wartime steward might be unwise.
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METHODOLOGY AND VARIABLE MEASUREMENT
A time series was to be used to establish the relationship between casualties, war support,
unemployment, and recruitment. The idea is to compare the data to see the impact that wartime
events and unemployment place on the war effort. To accomplish this, the datasets used are those
provided from official websites such as that of the Department of Labor and the Department of
Defense. Initially, the interaction between casualties, support for the war and presidential
approval will be studied. In general, when there are higher casualties and lower levels of war
support, presidential approval is lowered. The opposite also holds true, especially at the
beginning of an operation due to the ‘rally round the flag effect.
Unemployment was used to measure how recruitment efforts were helped or hindered by
perceptions of victory in the case of the Iraq War. Unemployment is reported in monthly
frequencies from the Department of Labor Statistics. With all other factors kept the same, my
hypotheses are as follows:
H1= if aggregate unemployment levels are higher, then aggregate military recruitment
should increase.
This is due to more people seeking jobs with the military, and this revamping of military
recruitment will make more voters rely directly on foreign policy for certain types of career
promotions. In turn, this might affect presidential approval during war, as more Americans (and
thus more voters) would rely on an aggressive foreign policy for economic reasons. Voters might
also be approving of what appears to be lower unemployment rates after military recruitment.
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Military recruitment was ascertained through yearly Defense Manpower Requirement
Reports produced by the Department of Defense. These reports indicate the actual and projected
total manpower yearly. The combining of the actual recruitment figures per year would give us
an accurate idea of the number of recruits coming into the military.
H2= if aggregate military recruitment increases, then there should be a comparable
increase in presidential approval.
Alongside that, there is another hypothesis that combines the intervening and the
dependent variable of presidential approval. This one deals with war support and how that
interacts with casualties to impact presidential approval. War support is measured as the
percentage of the population that approves of the handling of the war. Opinion polling on the
Iraq War was best accomplished by Gallup, however this surveying was not always consistent
and the lack of consistent data after 2007 severely limits the scope of my study. Response gaps
range from a few weeks to several months, at some points including only two observations a year
closer to 2011.
Casualties are reported daily, thanks to the Iraq Coalition Casualty Count project
(icasualties.org) compilation. Casualties are an important benchmark to the cost of the war and
can influence war support when the war is perceived as being lost.
H3= if war support levels increase within the population, then there will be higher
presidential approval.
This is natural and reassuring. As more people report approval of the president’s handling
of the war, more people will approve of his/her job more generally. Presidential approval data
25

was gathered through The American Presidency Project from the University of California.
Presidential approval is reported multiple times a month, with frequency varying from weekly to
biweekly.
Figure 1: Theoretical model of interacting effects on presidential approval

Feaver, Gelpi and Reifler use their models to reach all the conclusions from where our
understanding of war support comes from. I build on the work of other academics, with most of
my economic ideas stemming from the work of Suzanne De Boef and Paul M. Kellstedt. While
their work focuses on consumer confidence and mine will look at unemployment, the political
influence in the economy is the same in principle.85 In that effort Feaver, Gelpi and Reifler use
dummy variables to differentiate effects from presidential approval and policy surveying for
events unrelated to the Iraq War such as Hurricane Katrina.86 If a more detailed week by week
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analysis could be completed there are several important dates to watch for, including events such
as: Hurricane Katrina, the Battle of Fallujah, the Kay Report87, the stages of the war (major
combat, occupation, Iraqi sovereignty, surge), and the capture of Saddam Hussein. These events
combine with casualties and war support to provide a more thorough explanation of ow public
support builds and erodes over time. Some of the data on unemployment and military
recruitment recommends using lag periods of one and three months to get a more accurate
representation of economic impacts on the job market.88 After all, just because more people
volunteered to join the military, does not mean there will be more soldiers in combat zones the
next week.
The variables selected were the best publicly available quantitative variables. National
unemployment and presidential approval proved to be the best documented of all the variables,
as they were both regularly surveyed. Unemployment data is not without its flaws, as it is only
reported as a national aggregate per month, therefore exact weeks cannot be matched to see the
impact unemployment would have on recruitment. The casualty data was very well collected by
the Iraq Coalition Casualty Count, as the reporting was accurate and very detailed. Military
manpower information proved more difficult to arrive at and has significant limitations. Publicly
available manpower numbers are only offered once per year in a report finished after said year,
and total recruitment is not an isolated aspect of these reports. Simultaneously, the reports are not
always guaranteed, leaving us to use Department of Defense predicted figures for one of our
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observations. War support was perhaps the worst surveyed variable and that limits the
conclusions that can be drawn from this study. Surveying was more constant in the initial years
of the war, with at least an observation per season. In later years, Gallup stopped asking the
question as frequently, making the surveying later into the war insufficient to get a sense of
public opinion changes based on wartime events. This is particularly unfortunate since many
changes in the later years of the conflict played a significant role in bringing about the events
that would culminate in the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq, such as the Great Recession
beginning in 2007, the Surge of 2007, Obama’s campaign and later presidency, and the shifted
focus away from Iraq and toward the war in Afghanistan.
While there are ways to work around missing data, there is only so much that can be done
before the loss to accuracy is greater than would be preferred. As discussed before, the best
surveying question that tries to capture the people’s value of war support was collected by
Gallup but was done irregularly after 2007. This lack of information is made more impacting by
the fact that it fails to accurately document the later years of the war. Missing datapoints were
extrapolated from the other observations when it came to war support, at a loss to accuracy.
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ANALYSIS
To reach my conclusions I had to create graphs and compare their trajectories. I created
graphs for every variable as well as some graphs with more than one variable. I included some of
the graphs that I believe are the most important to understanding the effects I studied. The graphs
had to be created in a way that the data was standardized into biannual segments to make for
better comparisons across time. With a larger project and a more robust dataset, the type of week
by week analysis that is required to test the combined effects can be done effectively.
There are competing effects happening with my argument. My line of thinking for the
second hypothesis is that military recruitment would alleviate some of the tensions caused by
high levels of unemployment. At the same time, these new volunteers are likely to not be huge
opponents of current American foreign policy and could even come to agree with an aggressive
approach from the White House to end the war. Only a more detailed and thorough study would
be able to determine if my line of thinking would detract at all from the negative impact that high
unemployment means for a prosperous economy. Because my project had no way to isolate
Bush’s approval, it is difficult to comment on how much of this effect was observed. It is
important to note that Bush’s base of support for the war never entirely wavered, as war support
and Bush’s approval never drop below the high twenties. These lows do not even coincide in
time, as Bush’s approval drops much closer to the end of his presidency, and the American
public is least supportive of the war in 2007.
The data collection that was necessary to complete this project included a deliberate
selection of variables. These variables were chosen because they are the best indicators that can
be used to further the argument that the domestic economy influences war time events abroad,
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and therefore impacts presidential approval. Ultimately, the objective of the project cannot be
accurately achieved due to irregular data sampling, the inability to reduce the cyclical impact that
patterns have on the time series and a dataset that is even more robust is needed. This does not
mean that my efforts were wasted, as this paper serves as a stepping stone to a more
comprehensive study.
The effects that are most apparent are those of mounting casualties and low war support
leading to a lowered approval for the president. Regardless of interpretation, the Iraq War cannot
be said to have been a popular mission much after the initial combat with the Iraqi military was
over. The commitment of more troops and more engagements in 2007 to a war that increasingly
seemed unjustified, took its toll on Bush’s approval rating. Yet, this damage was not enough to
create a crisis of confidence in the president. The fact that the economy changed violently by the
end of 2007 is also an important effect that must be studied further. The impact of such a change
could explain why there was a slight resurgence in support for Bush. This could perhaps be like a
‘rally ‘round the flag’ effect for the economy, where voters are willing to support their executive
more in the short term due to daunting circumstances. In this case, the economy failing and our
intervention in two hard-fought wars, as well as natural disasters at home, could have created a
sense that Americans needed less changes and not more, therefore no extreme pressure ever
mounted to get rid of Bush or to leave Iraq.
In social sciences time itself can be an influencing variable. One simple example to
illustrate this point is the number of iPhone sales in the United States. New iPhone models are
usually released around August, with their stores attracting many eager customers. Sales would
likely be expected to increase at first and slowly decrease. One should not expect the same
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number of sales on debut day, cyber Monday and Christmas, as they would all have their own
independent effect on sales. This chronologic cyclical impact can be seen in our study in
responses to surveys asking about presidential approval or war support for missions in Iraq.89
One can imagine a respondent being less sympathetic to the effort in Iraq after being laid off
work, or more sympathetic after having a wonderful Thanksgiving reunion with their extended
family. This impact is controlled for by having multiple ‘players’ go through similar processes in
the same time, so for this project that would imply the addition of other similar states that fought
in Iraq alongside the United States. These would have to be prosperous democracies such as the
UK, Germany, Australia and others that participated in the war. Just as time can be an impacting
factor, so can other events that also impact the war. The presidency transferring from Bush to
Obama (and from a Republican to a Democrat) might have created an impact, that can also not
be isolated as the project does not compare the United States to any other actor. This project has
exclusively focused on the United States and their domestic markets, expanding this project to
include other highly industrialized democracies would shift the project from being a time series
analysis to a pooled time series analysis.
More data is needed to understand the impact of domestic economics on preventative
warfare in a highly industrialized democracy. Because of irregular surveying of American war
support and variables using different degrees of measurements, we decided that the best course
of action would be to standardize all the variables into a biannual observation. This was done by
averaging all observations within their respective six-month period into one value we could use
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to compare effects across variables. At that point the five variables were created into
informational graphs to be compared and to identify patterns. The missing war support value for
the second half of 2011 was replaced by extrapolating a pattern from the entire war support data.
Ultimately, the study yielded some expected and unexpected results. War support figures
seem to have some correlation to presidential approval, as the war support pattern generally
matches those of the Bush and Obama administration. By comparing the points on the
informational graphs, the combined effect between unemployment and military recruitment was
weaker than expected, as unemployment spikes after the housing market collapses, and total
military manpower does not see as large of an increase as I expected. Presidential approval
seems to not be as impacted by the economy as by the war, and this is seen in the very mild drop
in President Bush’s popularity in Late 2007. However, this effect is difficult to isolate with
certainty due to the events around it. International issues including war should attract most of the
American public’s focus, yet after Late 2007, voters are expected to revert to a more selfcentered economic outlook on government. It is also difficult to say how war support is affected
by a deteriorating economic climate. Are voters considering the possibility that more military
interventionism might increase government spending and increase confidence in the US markets,
or are they suggesting cutting defense spending to inject that money into the economy instead?
Without more specific surveying or expanding the study to one of democratic citizens in general
across many prosperous democracies, it is difficult to isolate those opinions. The ideas of Gelpi,
Feaver and Reifler were not disproven, as casualties alone did not create pressure to leave the
country, as is seen in how war support is unaffected by the increase of US casualties during the
Surge.
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CONCLUSION
By studying the combined effects of casualties and support for the given mission we can
get a sense of how tolerant the public is on the war. This combined effect is heavily colored by
perceptions of the war and events on the ground, with casualties being more impacting when
progress is slow. War support and unemployment were studied to calculate their impact on
recruitment efforts shortly before and during the war. The fact that the U.S. employs a volunteer
force and is considered a less regulated market leads me to conclude that unemployment might
be more impactful in times of war.
The study of war is nowhere near complete. The media’s impact was largely discussed in
the literature as an important factor.90 Rhetoric used on the campaign trail during election years
is an important part of the public discourse, that ultimately shapes public opinion and creates
points of debate between candidates. This debate proliferates critiques of the government and
ideas about what the best option is, thus challenging the incumbents’ actions while in office.91
Psychological and sociological trends could be further studied to understand how people
perceive success and how societies react to wars. Interactions between nationalities in this way
color their historical identity and this bias may have important long-term impacts.92 There are
also possibilities to expand on the economic part of the study, as there could be some economic
tolerances that might be present in war just like there is tolerance for casualties.
There is some feedback loop of sorts between the war support, casualties, unemployment,
and presidential approval. The literature suggests this link through the idea that the public sees
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the president as a steward of the economy and government. If recruitment was hampered (by
either economic reasons or from a lack of war support), there could be backlash against the
administration for their perceived errors in stewardship. This feedback loop system needs to be
studied in more detail to see how the cyclical nature of economic and political influence feed
each other.
Studies on warfare are limited to time-specific episodes, each one changing based on the
technology available at the time and the circumstance around the conflict. It does not seem that
the historical trend of states warring will disappear anytime soon, meaning the same principles in
this study may be applied to other modern conflicts. The war in Afghanistan could be studied
following the principles of this study to see how long-term economics affect the war effort.
While polling data may be difficult to secure consistently for previous wars, contemporary wars
have been better catalogued as far as domestic polling.
Presidential campaigning rhetoric must be analyzed in its impact on war support. We
know that elite rhetoric has some impact on public opinion, yet we do not have a clear picture of
how political debates and multiple political voices on one issue can impact war support. There is
likely also an impact on presidential approval, as there would be more rhetoric against the White
House’s actions in the public discourse than during a non-election year. Ultimately, the historical
approach of that party to this issue seems to be a telling factor in what the winning candidate’s
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approach will be, as voters gravitate toward a fresh approach but one that isn’t too far off the
beaten path.93
Presidential campaigning rhetoric is a factor that should have been studied more closely,
as the effect it has on public opinion is divisive rather than conciliatory. John McCain and
Barack Obama’s 2008 election shed light on the impact of campaigning rhetoric when there is no
incumbent, therefore being different than the 2004 election. McCain and Obama became the
winners of their respective primaries, therefore solidifying their parties’ stances on the war. Their
winning shut out voices that spoke against their parties’ historical take on Iraq, such as Ron
Paul’s labelling of the invasion a mistake despite his run as a Republican. This entrenched both
sides further in their parties’ arguments on the war, with Republican voters being more likely to
support an even more aggressive approach and Democrats wanting more discussion of a
timetable for leaving Iraq.94 McCain’s take on the war was that the Surge was working and
needed to be followed through to success, adding that a timetable would be akin to surrendering
to the enemy on an arbitrary date. Obama’s approach was that the global war on terror started by
Bush remained our top security priority and needed to be pursued in a smarter more calculated
way, with Iraq being a ‘distraction’ to meeting that goal.95 Near the end of the campaigning
season, the economy eclipsed the Iraq issue in the priority of voters, yet most of the debating had
been over war policy. Obama’s rhetoric worked to create an association between McCain and the
failed approach of the Bush presidency. While voters continued to express through surveys that
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they felt McCain was the more experienced candidate, they felt more comfortable with Obama’s
judgement than that of McCain.96 It is argued that the arguments made by McCain against
Obama were very similar to those made by Hillary Clinton during the Democratic primaries, and
this gave Obama a chance to practice his defense. Ultimately, the direction of the war seems to
have been chosen more by the political parties’ historical stance toward the war than the
American public, as there was support for both continuing the war and leaving. There never
developed any serious pressure to leave Iraq as occurred during the Vietnamese war era.
The United States is a very particular country. Being a democratic mixed economy with
strong capitalist tendencies and a relatively unregulated market give the U.S. their ability to fight
with low numbers of highly trained troops and complex weapons systems. Other nations have
their own way of recruiting and then equipping their armies, which may be studied further to
understand the political and economic influences behind such a decision. This study is also
limited in scope to the Iraq War, and only deals with American public opinion. This study could
be expanded to include the domestic opinion of other Coalition countries that participated in the
invasion of Iraq, particularly those that resemble us in their government and economic system.

96

Bostdorff, "Judgment, Experience, and Leadership,” 268-269.

38

REFERENCES
Appy, Christian G. Working-class War: American Combat Soldiers and Vietnam. Chapel Hill,
NC: University of North Carolina, 1993.
Baker, William D., and John R. Oneal. 2001. “Patriotism or Opinion Leadership? The Nature
and Origins of the ‘Rally ‘Round the Flag’ Effect. Journal of Conflict Resolution 45, no.
5 (October); University of Maryland.
Boef, Suzanna De, and Paul M. Kellstedt. “The Political (and Economic) Origins of Consumer
Confidence.” American Journal of Political Science 48, no. 4 (2004).
Bostdorff, Denise M. "Judgment, Experience, and Leadership: Candidate Debates on the Iraq
War in the 2008 Presidential Primaries." EBSCO. July 1, 2009.
Bruneau, Thomas C., and Scott D. Tollefson, Univ of Texas Pr, 2008.
Burk, James. “Public Support for Peacekeeping in Lebanon and Somalia: Assessing the
Casualties Hypothesis.” Political Science Quarterly 114, no. 1 (Spring 1999): 53-78.
Accessed May 26, 2018.
Cohn, Lindsay P., and Nathan W. Toronto. “Markets and Manpower.” Armed Forces & Society
43, no. 3 (2016). Princeton University Press.
Gallup, Inc. “Confidence in Institutions.” Gallup.com. Accessed April 23, 2018.
http://news.gallup.com/poll/1597/confidence-institutions.aspx.
39

Gelpi, Christopher, Peter D. Feaver, and Jason Reifler. Paying the human costs of war: American
public opinion and casualties in military conflicts. Princeton University Press, 2009.
Hartung, William D., and Michelle Ciarrocca. “Report: Ties That Bind: Arms Industry Influence
in the Bush Administration and Beyond.” World Policy Journal. October 2004. Accessed
May 30, 2018. https://worldpolicy.org/report-ties-that-bind-arms-industry-influence-inthe-bush-administration-and-beyond/
Jentleson, Bruce W. “The Pretty Prudent Public: Post Post-Vietnam American Opinion on the
Use of Military Force.” International Studies Quarterly 36, no. 1 (March 1992):
Accessed June 14, 2018.
Johnson, Dominic, and Dominic Tierney. 2006. Failing to Win: Perceptions of Victory and
Defeat in International Politics. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Kriner, Douglas L., and Francis X. Shen. The Casualty Gap: The Causes and Consequences of
American Wartime Inequalities. Oxford University Press, 2010. PDF.
Micewski, Edwin R., “Conscription or the All-Volunteer Force: Recruitment in a Democratic
Society” in Who Guards the Guardians and How Democratic Civil-military Relations, ed.
Bruneau, Thomas C., and Scott D. Tollefson, Univ of Texas Pr, 2008.
Mueller, John E. War, Presidents, and Public Opinion. John Wiley & Sons, 1973.
Perloff, Jeffrey M. Microeconomics: Theory and Applications with Calculus. Boston: Addison-

40

Wesley, 2011
RAND Corporation, “What Affects Decisions to Enlist in the Military?”
Reiter, Dan, and Allan C. Stam. 2002. Democracies at War. Princeton University Press.
Seasonally-Adjusted Data: What It Really Means | Bureau of Transportation Statistics. Accessed
November 05, 2018. https://www.bts.gov/explore-topics-andgeography/topics/seasonally-adjusted-data-what-it-really-means.
Sethi, Rajiv. “Collective Memory.” International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, 2nd edition.
“What Affects Decisions to Enlist in the Military?” RAND Corporation. Accessed April 23,
2018. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB7523/index1.html.
Wilson, Michael J., and M.S. Perry. “The Career Decision Survey: Modeling the Army
Enlistment Decision.” 1988. Accessed June 16, 2018.

41

